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BRIDGING THE GAP: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY
C. Antoinette Clarke*
INTRODUCTION
The rigid system of classifying juvenile offenders as either children
or adults is a poor method of dealing with the complexities of adoles-
cent crime. We can address this inadequacy by integrating the rapidly
emerging knowledge about the structure and function of the human
brain and the formal properties of adolescent decisionmaking into the
law's focus on human thought and behavior.
There are several reasons why actors in our justice system should
embrace child development principles. Childhood is an intense period
of rapid development, which culminates in the tasks of identity forma-
tion and social integration. No stage in human development, except
infancy, results in such a rapid and dramatic change as adolescence.
The development of tasks in adolescence is exquisitely sensitive to en-
vironmental influences-whether peer, educational, familial, or social.
To further complicate matters, adolescent years are characterized by a
struggle for autonomy from the same adults upon whom adolescents
still depend. These changes are accompanied by rapid neurobiological
concomitants, which are reflected in cognitive, emotional, and abstract
reasoning, as well as changes in moral development.
Unfortunately, many officials dealing with juvenile offenders have
essentially no training in childhood development. Judges, prosecutors,
and public defenders are routinely faced with offenders who are psy-
chologically different from their adult counterparts. As a result, there
are paradoxical consequences of developmentally inappropriate sanc-
tions for youth crime. There is the very real risk that a punitive ap-
proach to youth crime can do more harm than good to a child who is
still in the process of neurobiological, psychological, social, and moral
development.
The application of a biological and psychosocial understanding of
behavior to problems of law has, until recently, been slow to gain ac-
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law. I would like to express
my deepest gratitude to Melissa Secrist for her invaluable research assistance and sounding
board duties (around prepping for the MPRE, no less).
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ceptance. 1 Legal scholarship often focuses on the technical issues of
drafting, interpretation, and application; it is as much a field of literary
study as a science of behavior. Over the past century, significant steps
have been made to look beyond these internal concerns, and the study
of law has expanded to include approaches informed by a variety of
other disciplines, including the social sciences.
Integrating science into law and policy presents special challenges
for policymakers, because science and law diverge in their basic orien-
tations. Good science often moves forward by leaving certain ques-
tions open, by entertaining a number of possible hypotheses, and by
recognizing the contingent nature of scientific truth.2 In contrast, law
aims to define and close questions by providing yes or no answers
based on limited information. The cultivated uncertainty that is a sci-
entific virtue is anathema to legal decisionmakers. To fully integrate
law with biology and the social sciences, we must take not only an
interdisciplinary approach but a cross-cultural one.
From a developmental perspective, a child's interaction with the
justice system is a key opportunity for society to demonstrate its true
values and clearly articulate its expectations. If their experiences with
social authorities seem thoughtless, impersonal, or indifferent, chil-
dren will not learn to internalize personal responsibility for their ac-
tions. The predictability and consistency of adult attention and
responsiveness is often what is most important to children. Comllica-
tions develop when punishment is applied thoughtlessly to youth in a
manner that does not foster positive development, but rather fore-
stalls it. Thus, decisionmakers in the justice system, including the ju-
venile delinquency courts, should focus on the developmental,
emotional, and social needs of the individual offender, rather than the
characteristics of the individual offense. In short, the system should
be offender-driven, not offense-driven.
The hallmark of juvenile justice should be the rehabilitative ideal
that has seemingly been lost in the adult system. If juveniles are still
in the process of developing proper judgment and moral reasoning,
the response to the faulty exercise of those less-than-developed skills
should be guidance and support. Some youth may need more gui-
dance and direct intervention than others, but the emphasis must be
on helping the juvenile develop into a responsible adult. As many
1. Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1130-34 (2004); Erin
Ann O'Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
Soc'y B 1677 (2004).
2. Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW AND THE
BRAIN 227 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2004).
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parents and teachers know, designing constructive sanctions for
wrongdoing can be challenging, but they are worthwhile because they
increase the developmental, educational, and social yield. Children
should become more mature and responsible as a result of construc-
tive sanctions.
This Article takes an interdisciplinary approach to the current
methods for controlling and correcting youth crime. Part II provides a
brief survey of psychological, neurobiological, and sociological re-
search on child development. 3 Special attention is paid to those devel-
opmental factors that can affect an adolescent's choice to break the
law. Part III discusses the current punitive approach to juvenile of-
fending-"adult time for adult crime"-and the harmful effect such
treatment has on the child's positive development.4 Part IV suggests
ways in which this new evidence about child development can be ap-
plied in the juvenile court in the areas of adjudication, disposition, and
correction. 5
II. PSYCHOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE, AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
Criminal law demands that we restrain ourselves from performing
certain actions that may otherwise seem pleasurable or attractive.
Some of us are more easily inhibited than others, and we punish those
who are not limited by adequate inhibitions. The law's approach to
the question of human motivation and decisionmaking has customa-
rily been based upon rather crude working assumptions about individ-
uals: persons of competent mental capacity are free to choose their
actions, act rationally, act in their own best interests, and can foresee
the consequences of their actions. But these assumptions do not pro-
vide an entirely accurate guide to human behavior. If young offenders
have not reached the developmental stage where their inhibitory
mechanism has fully developed, their actions are less a sign of per-
sonal failure and more a sign of youthful inability.
New research indicates that earlier presumptions about the physical
and moral development of our children are incorrect. Child develop-
ment can roughly be divided into three broad spheres: psychosocial,
intellectual, and neurological. In each of these areas, research is un-
covering the realities of the nature of development and adolescence
that affect a young person's capacity to use sound judgment, make
good choices, and control behavior. The portions of the brain respon-
3. See infra notes 6-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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sible for judgment and inhibition, as well as the social processes that
lead to the development of morality and responsible decisionmaking,
develop at a later stage in life than was previously thought. Experts
have realized that experiences in this later stage can have an impact
on a child's physical and social maturation. These new understandings
of the developing brain and its impact on psychosocial development
lead to the conclusion that children should not be subject to the same
sorts of punishment that are appropriate for adult offenders, and that
a retooling of our approach to adolescent offenders is warranted.
A. Psychosocial Development
Psychosocial researchers and scholars have examined the differ-
ences between adolescents and adults that may be relevant to criminal
responsibility. 6 Research suggests that certain developmental factors
characteristic of adolescence contribute to immature judgment in
ways that are likely to affect criminal choice.7
According to Professors Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Stein-
berg, "[W]e cannot claim that adolescents 'ought to know better' if, in
fact, the evidence indicates that they do not know better, or, more
accurately, cannot know better, because they lack the abilities needed
to exercise mature judgment."'8 Their research suggests that adoles-
cents view long-term consequences as less important than short-term
consequences and thus see many risks as inconsequential. This is due,
in part, to their uncertainty about the future, which leads them to dis-
count the severity of risks. During the teen years, youths seek more
novel and intense sensations, and social status among peers becomes
an important factor in decisionmaking. 9 Youths do not fully mature
until they have developed their own identity: "To the extent ... that
maturity of judgment goes hand in hand with a consolidation of a
6. See generally Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Justice: A Develop-
mental Perspective, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 229 (1996) (examining a trend of punitive sentences
in juvenile court); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adoles-
cence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996)
[hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity] (analyzing the differences between adolescents'
and adults' judgment); Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Stud-
ying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1996) (examining
children's capacities and performance in regard to psychology and the law).
7. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmen-
tal Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
291, 310 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
8. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Develop-
mental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389, 404
(1999).
9. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Ado-
lescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1772-73 (1995).
[Vol. 56:927930
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sense of identity, research... suggests that most individuals would not
be expected to display consistently mature judgment until the age of
eighteen, at the earliest."10  As Cauffman and Steinberg note,
"[G]ains in self-esteem and identity consolidation continue during the
transition into one's twenties."11 They identify three broad categories
of psychosocial factors that affect decisionmaking: responsibility (self-
reliance, clarity of identity, and healthy autonomy), perspective (the
ability to understand the complexity of a situation), and temperance
(the ability to limit impulsivity and evaluate situations before act-
ing).12 These factors undergo significant developmental changes over
the course of adolescence. During this time, children learn to think
deductively, to think about hypothetical situations, to think simultane-
ously in multiple dimensions, to think abstractly, and to think about
the process of thinking (metacognition).' 3
Professors Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso have also identified a
number of psychosocial factors that influence an adolescent's ability
to make judgments, such as conformity to peers, perception of risk,
and temporal perspective.1 4 According to their research, pressure to
conform to peers peaks around age fourteen.' 5 They also note that
the greater inclination of adolescents to take risks may arise out of a
lesser awareness of the risks, a different assessment of the probabili-
ties behind risks, and differing values attached to the outcomes.16
Peer pressure and ostracism also play a role in the cost-benefit analy-
sis. Temporally, adolescents weigh short-term benefits or conse-
quences more heavily than long-term benefits, which results in taking
long-term risks for short-term benefits.1 7 They suggest that this may
be the result of both uncertainty about the future and different per-
ceptions of time-spans.1 8 They further argue that delinquent behavior
decreases in late adolescence, indicating that these factors are not just
individual traits, but are instead a part of the development of children
10. Id. at 1776-77.
11. Id. at 1778.
12. See id. at 1764-65 (arguing for "a developmental approach to the definition of maturity of
judgment").
13. See generally JOHN H. FLAVELL ET AL., COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 131-72 (3d ed. 1993)
(describing different areas of cognitive development).
14. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160-64 (1997) [here-
inafter Scott & Grisso, Evolution].
15. Id. at 162.
16. Id. at 163.
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id.
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through adolescence and into adulthood. 19 They note that this should
serve to reduce culpability for youthful offenders:
If youthful choices to offend are based on diminished ability to
make decisions, or if the choices (or the values that shape the
choices) are strongly driven by transient developmental influences,
then the presumption of free will and rational choice is weakened.
Psychology, in providing evidence that developmental psychosocial
factors may shape decision-making well into adolescence, lends sup-
port to the intuitive conclusion that immature offenders are less cul-
pable than their adult counterparts. 20
B. Intellectual Development
"Social learning" theories emphasize the acquisition of learned
moral behavior.21 Under these theories, children learn morality by
being rewarded or punished for their behavior. They also learn by
observing behavior in others and the reactions such behavior elicits.
They model their behavior after the behavior of others-whether
adults or peers.22 Moral behavior is learned like other behaviors and
skills, and it results in increasing conformity with the standards ex-
pected by society.23 Accordingly, these theories seem to contemplate
a more extended period during which morality develops.
"Cognitive developmental" theories focus on a child's developmen-
tal ability to reason morally, to think about moral problems, and to
make moral decisions. 24 Psychologist Jean Piaget found that, for chil-
dren younger than ten, the intention of an actor is not the true mea-
sure of fault; rather, it is how much harm occurs.25 It is only in older
children that motives and intentions play a role in assessing fault. 26
An ability to understand the mental states of others requires experi-
ence with other people, and this understanding implies a cognitive as-
pect. Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg shows that this moral
development continues throughout the teenage years and even into
early adulthood. 27 Kohlberg found that children progress from what
19. Id. at 166-67.
20. Scott & Grisso, Evolution, supra note 14, at 173.
21. For a general discussion of the moral development of youth, see DANUTA BUKATKO &
MARVIN W. DAEHLER, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: A TOPICAL APPROACH 534-73 (1992).
22. Id. at 537-38.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 536.
25. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1932). For
a discussion of Piaget's work, see BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note 21, at 541-43.
26. BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note 21, at 541,
27. See 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmen-
tal Approach, in ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT: THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES 170 (1984) [hereinafter KOHLBERG,
[Vol. 56:927
BRIDGING THE GAP
he called the "preconventional" stage to the "conventional" and
"postconventional" stages of moral reasoning.2 8 Children at the
preconventional stage focus on punishment and reward, which is
known as "heteronomous morality. '2 9 In order to avoid punishment,
they avoid breaking rules; they ignore motive and focus solely on the
consequences of the act. 30 Their next concern at this stage is "naive
instrumental hedonism," or "individualism, instrumental purpose, and
exchange," in which children are focused on following the rules only
when it is in their interest. 31 This includes an appreciation of awards
and a recognition that there is more involved in moral judgment than
simply the magnitude of the consequences of the act.32
Children at the conventional stage recognize that there are societal
rules and a social order. At this stage, the intentions, motives, and
perspectives of others play a role in moral reasoning. In the "mutual
interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conform-
ity" substage, the child's focus is on avoiding disapproval. 33 This is a
step beyond simply avoiding punishment and living up to what is ex-
pected of the child. Here, motives become important. At the "au-
thority maintaining" or "social system and conscience" substage, the
stress shifts to adhering to rules and accepting and fulfilling duties
within the context of the social system. 34 While some children may
reach Kohlberg's postconventional or principled stage, this is more
likely to be reached as a young adult, rather than during adoles-
cence.35 It is at this time that the individual has developed an under-
standing of the nature of laws and rules. They are now seen as the
result of a social contract that all individuals must uphold because of
shared responsibilities and duties. At this stage, the individual recog-
nizes the relative and sometimes arbitrary nature of rules, but also
understands that certain principles and values, such as justice and
human dignity, must be preserved at all costs. 36 Again, the cognitive
Moral Stages]; Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Ap-
proach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David
A. Goslin ed., 1969) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence].
28. Each stage has two sub-stages, which are given different titles in Kohlberg's works. Cf.
KOHLBERG, Moral Stages, supra note 27; Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence, supra note 27. For a full
discussion of these stages, see BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note 21, at 544-46.
29. KOHLBERG, Moral Stages, supra note 27, at 174-76 tbl.2.1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. KOHLBERG, Moral Stages, supra note 27, at 172.
36. See BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note 21, at 545.
2007]
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aspects of development are clear. Childhood experiences and the ob-
servation of others play a role in a child's ability to reason about
moral issues. In learning how to act in a society, how violations are
punished, how rules come to be, and how to understand themselves in
the context of society, children will learn from their interactions with
others.
It is axiomatic that as experiences accrue, so too will the skills that
help the child to achieve adult capabilities. This fundamental truth
supports a less punitive approach to antisocial behavior in children.
C. Neurobiology
Cognitive neuroscience, which relates brain activity to human
thought and behavior, also contributes to our understanding of ado-
lescent decisionmaking. Researchers have determined that maximum
brain changes, previously thought to occur early in life,37 actually oc-
cur much later in the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that gov-
erns judgment and self-control. 38 Neurologist Elizabeth Sowell notes
the significance of these areas of the brain for human behavior:
"[T]he frontal lobes are essential for such functions as response inhibi-
tion, emotional regulation, planning and organization. Many of these
aptitudes continue to develop between adolescence and young adult-
hood. ' 39 This development takes time:
Over a span of roughly ten to twelve years, the adolescent brain,
through a series of sometimes subtle and sometimes breathtakingly
dramatic shifts, is transformed from child to adult. The gray matter
of an adolescent's frontal lobes grows denser and then abruptly
scales back, molding a leaner thinking machine. The teenage brain
fine-tunes its most human part, the prefrontal cortex, the place that
helps us cast a wary eye, link cause to effect, decide "maybe not"-
the part, in fact, that acts grown-up.40
Thus, the physical development process takes place not only during
childhood and the teen years, but into the twenties as well. As other
studies have confirmed, the "[m]ore complex 'executive' functions of
prefrontal cortex such as reasoning, motivation, and judgment appear
to develop gradually during childhood and adolescence... continuing
37. See Peter R. Huttenlocher, Synaptic Density in Human Frontal Cortex-Developmental
Changes and Effects of Aging, 163 BRAIN RES. 195 (1979).
38. Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 233-38; Linda Patia Spear, Neurobehavioral Changes in Adoles-
cence, 9 CURRENT DIRECIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 111 (2000).
39. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-adolescent Brain Maturation in Fron-
tal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999) (citation omitted).
40. BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES Aaotrr THE
TEENAGE BRAIN TELL Us ABOUT OUR KIDS 203-04 (2003).
[Vol. 56:927
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during the adult years."' 41 The recognition of differences in the
neurobiological development of the brain regions responsible for
judgment comports with developmental hypotheses found in the non-
neurological study of intellectual and psychosocial maturation by
scientists such as Kohlberg, Scott, Grisso, Cauffman, and Steinberg.
Thus, the teenage years constitute a critical period, and there should
be great concern over environmental influences and a recognition that
what is experienced during this period will affect a child's develop-
ment. According to Dr. David Fassler of the American Psychiatric
Association's Council on Children, Adolescents and Their Families,
"As science continues to show how behavior and brain structure
dance in tandem-anatomy influences emotions and experiences, and
emotions, and experiences, in turn, alter the fundamental architecture
of the brain-we do have to be even more concerned.., about certain
kinds of experiences teenagers may have."'42 In other words, exper-
iences cause physical changes in the brain, and those physical changes
will affect the way people react to future stimuli.
One of the main tasks of the brain, particularly of the prefrontal
cortex, is to inhibit actions. As the brain develops through childhood
and adolescence, it is this very inhibition machinery that is being fine-
tuned. What can we expect of adolescents if that inhibition machin-
ery, the prefrontal cortex, is not yet fully tuned? Children, including
teenagers, may simply not be as capable at inhibiting behavior as
adults. Coupled with a biological inability to understand the conse-
quences of their actions, it has now become clear that adolescents are
far less capable of choosing to obey the law than was previously
thought. While the brain may be sufficiently developed for many
tasks in early childhood, when it comes to inhibition and understand-
ing the consequences vital to moral reasoning, the wiring for the task
is not yet complete.
Scientific evidence supports the idea that most adolescents are less
mature than adults in ways that distinguish a teenager's decision to
offend, and scholars have argued for changes in juvenile justice.43 The
identity of the young person on whom punishment is to be imposed is
amorphous and undefined. Children do not have the same capacity to
control their behavior or make rational decisions as adults. They lack
41. Peter R. Huttenlocher & Arun S. Dabholkar, Regional Differences in Synaptogenesis in
Human Cerebral Cortex, 387 J. CoMp. NEUROLOGY 167, 178 (1997).
42. STRAUCH, supra note 40, at 212.
43. According to Cauffman and Steinberg, "Our impression is that if the theoretical links
between psychosocial characteristics and maturity of judgment can be experimentally validated,
one might justify a general distinction between adolescents sixteen and younger and those seven-
teen and older." Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 9, at 1788.
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foresight and are prone to make decisions without careful delibera-
tion, often not fully understanding the consequences of their actions.
While they may be able to distinguish right from wrong in an abstract
sense, other influences drive them to behave in ways inconsistent with
that understanding.
The social cost of youth crime can be minimized by policies that
ameliorate the impact of punishment on the future lives and prospects
of young offenders. The social cost of incarcerating individuals who
would soon outgrow their delinquency is nothing less than a waste of
lives. This is not to suggest that those who commit offenses as
juveniles should simply be left to their own devices; it does, however,
cry out for intervention and rehabilitation rather than simple incarcer-
ation or other forms of retribution. Cauffman and Steinberg suggest
that society recognize three categories of offenders: "juveniles, who
should not be adjudicated in adult court; adults, who should; and
youths, who may or may not be developmentally appropriate candi-
dates for adult trial and sanctioning, depending on their characteristics
[such as maturity and amenability to treatment] and circumstances." 44
With all due respect to such noted researchers, I submit that their
categories do not go far enough to protect youth and opportunity. My
suggested policy changes are outlined in Part IV.
III. PUNITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
There is a well-developed body of literature that criticizes the in-
creasingly severe treatment of juveniles and argues that society should
be more willing to take their immaturity into account when deciding
how they should be treated.45 While a full survey of that research is
beyond the scope of this Article, a brief summary of the legal treat-
ment of juveniles and the consequences of such treatment will prove
illustrative.
In the first part of the eighteenth century, the common-law infancy
defense controlled the disposition of juvenile offenders. Under this
defense, children under the age of seven were legally incapable of
criminal behavior, those between the ages of seven and fourteen were
44. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 8, at 414.
45. See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, note 9, at 1789 (arguing that "distinctions must be drawn
between younger and older adolescents"); Scott & Grisso, Evolution, supra note 14, at 137-41
(suggesting a juvenile justice policy that is formulated in a developmental framework); Steinberg
& Cauffman, supra note 8, at 390 (arguing that adolescent development should be considered
when adjudicating young offenders as adults); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of
Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 145 (2003) (proposing a juvenile system "that
acknowledges rather than ignores the contributions made by developmental research").
[Vol. 56:927
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presumed to lack the capacity to establish the mental elements of a
crime, and children over the age of fourteen were presumed to have
sufficient mental capacity to be criminally liable.46 Thus, while the
common law protected young children and adolescents, teenagers
faced severe punishment and even death. 47
The late nineteenth century brought about reform in the treatment
of juveniles. The creation of separate juvenile courts "was a product
of the social reform movement of that period. '48 The new juvenile
system "reflected the late 19th century understanding of the nature of
crime and a new recognition of psychological differences between
youths and adults, which was emerging from the 'new' science of psy-
chology. ' 49 This progressive approach defined the offenses of chil-
dren as acts of delinquency rather than crimes. Juveniles came to be
viewed as having different competencies than adults, and therefore
needed to be adjudicated in a different type of venue. The malleabil-
ity of youth and their potential for change was a reason to award a
second chance and the prospect of rehabilitation. 50 Despite those in-
stances, it was clear that the courts recognized children as being some-
thing other than miniature adults.
Recently, the pendulum of reform has swung back in the other di-
rection. Motivated by increasing juvenile crime rates and a loss of
faith in rehabilitation, states have increased the punishment faced by
many young offenders and have eroded the boundary between the
adult and juvenile justice systems.5 1 Advocates for tougher policies
argue that young criminals represent a serious threat to public safety
that can only be contained if they are punished as adults.52 Dis-
enchantment with juvenile courts also played a role, as critics claimed
that excessive leniency toward young offenders contributed to the
youth crime problem.5 3 Their reforms are embodied in several legisla-
tive strategies under which juveniles facing criminal charges are in-
creasingly treated like adults.
46. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 45, at 145; Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Super-
predator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 159, 159-60 (2000).
47. See VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 72-94 (1987) (citing instances
from the colonial era through the 1930s in which children who were as young as ten at the time
of their crimes were executed); Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The Ultimate
Denial of Juvenile Justice, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 129 (2003).
48. Scott & Grisso, Evolution, supra note 14, at 141.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 142-43.
51. See generally Grisso, supra note 6.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The first of such reforms is that the age at which a juvenile can be
subject to adult criminal proceedings ("waiver" or "transfer") has
been lowered in most states; in many jurisdictions, pre-teens can be
tried as adults and sentenced to prison.54 In addition, the range of
felonies that can result in adult prosecution has been substantially
broadened to include not only serious violent crimes, but also less se-
rious felonies such as drug crimes.55 In some states, prosecutors have
substantial discretion to decide, without judicial approval, whether
young offenders will be adjudicated in juvenile or criminal court.5 6
Under legislative waiver statutes, criminal court jurisdiction is trig-
gered automatically, based solely on the child's age and the offense,
with no individualized evaluation of amenability to treatment or
immaturity.57
Lawmakers have also responded to criticism of the juvenile system
by narrowing the gap between juvenile court dispositions and criminal
sentences ("blended sentencing" or "extended juvenile jurisdic-
tion"). 58 Dispositional jurisdiction for serious crimes has been ex-
tended into adulthood in many states, and incarceration that begins in
juvenile detention can be completed in adult prisons.59 Juvenile
crimes were traditionally viewed as the mistakes of wayward youth
and records were customarily sealed, but today youthful transgres-
sions often carry adult consequences. In some states, juveniles who
commit sex offenses against minors are subject to statutory registra-
tion requirements, under which they are publicly identified and per-
manently labeled as sex offenders. 60
To understand the full import of the decision to subject juvenile of-
fenders to adult punishment, it is necessary to not only consider the
impact on the individual youth, but also the impact on society at large,
which must deal with the aftermath of that decision. One of the ap-
54. For a recent summary of state laws, see Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Court, Juv. OF-
FENDERS & VICTIMS NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2003,
at 6-10.
55. Id.
56. While the exact number of juveniles prosecuted as adults each year is unknown since
legislative and prosecutorial waivers are hard to track, at least one estimate places the number as
high as 200,000. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND ViC-rIMs: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 106 (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter4.pdf.
57. Sickmund, supra note 54, at 6-10.
58. See Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?, 54
ARK. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (2002).
59. Id.; C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Puni-
tive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 719-23 (2005).
60. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLES-
CENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 63-68 (2004).
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parent assumptions of proponents of transfer and blended sentencing
is that juveniles will be "scared straight" by the symbolic action of
removal from juvenile court.61 Extensive empirical research, how-
ever, has shown that waiver does not generate either specific or gen-
eral deterrent effects; it actually increases recidivism rates in
juveniles. 62 A study comparing juveniles tried in adult courts with
juveniles retained by juvenile courts found that "[t]he transfer group
recidivated at a higher rate than the nontransfer group" among "all
seven classes of offense[s]" studied. 63 Furthermore, a review of re-
search indicates that the increased recidivism is unrelated to either
sentence type or length; hence, "the mere fact that juveniles have
been convicted in criminal rather than juvenile court increases the
likelihood that they will reoffend. ' '64
Youths convicted of violent crimes are likely to be incarcerated, and
their sentences are likely to be served in adult correctional facilities.
65
They will also serve far longer sentences than they would in the juve-
nile system. 66 Juvenile inmates adjust poorly to prison life, which gen-
erates not only troubling experiences for youths as a group, but also
gives rise to concomitant administrative and social costs. 67 Young
people in adult prisons are at greater risk of both sexual and violent
victimization than both older inmates and comparable youths in juve-
nile facilities. 68 Suicide rates for this group "greatly exceed the rate
for the general youth population" and are "several times higher than
the rate for youths in juvenile detention centers. ' 69 In addition,
61. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227, 245 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter Bishop & Frasier, Consequences]; see also
Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make a Differ-
ence?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 173 (1996) [hereinafter Bishop et al., Transfer].
62. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 245-48; Bishop et al., Transfer, supra
note 61, at 183.
63. Bishop et al., Transfer, supra note 61, at 183.
64. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 261.
65. Thirty-one states routinely house juveniles with adults, while five others mix the two
groups in some of their facilities. Id. at 252. Only six states have never housed juveniles with
inmates age eighteen or older. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE JUVENILE COURT 241 (1999): see also Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at
252.
66. FELD, supra note 65, at 232; Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 234-35 &
tbl.7.3.
67. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 240-4 1; see also Marilyn D. MeShane &
Frank P. Williams III, The Prison Adjustment of Juvenile Offenders, 35 CRIME & DELINO. 254.
265-66 (1989).
68. See Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Conse-
quences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 9-10 (1989).
69. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 252.
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juveniles in adult prisons are much less likely to receive academic in-
struction or mental health treatment than their counterparts in the
juvenile system. 70 These factors are likely to impact long-term success
rates.
While incarcerated, juveniles will be surrounded by adult criminals
who are characteristically "older, stronger, more seasoned and more
violent" than the population in juvenile facilities. 71 The prison setting
may therefore foster significant opportunity for the criminal socializa-
tion of developing youths by more experienced adult offenders.72 Op-
portunities for negative socialization are increased because juveniles
are "approximately twice as likely to be problem inmates than the
group of young adult inmates. ' 73 Inmates with poor disciplinary
records are less likely to receive work benefits or to earn credit for
good behavior, both of which can reduce the length of incarceration. 74
Consequently, actual prison stays for young offenders tend to be
longer than stays for other inmates with comparable sentences.
The consequences of treating juveniles as adults go far beyond the
actual prison sentence. The most dramatic illustration of the impact
on youth occurs after the juvenile is released. Criminal convictions
create a social stigma that greatly impedes the chances for reform af-
ter incarceration. In most states, a convicted felon may not receive
social services, participate in a jury, hold elective office, or even
vote. 75 But the effects on long-term employment opportunities may
have the most immediate negative impact. Unlike juvenile delin-
quency adjudications, criminal convictions must be reported on em-
ployment applications. Disclosure of a felony record mortgages
"opportunities and prospects for stable employment in life," 76 which is
particularly problematic since "job stability is central in explaining
adult desistance from crime. '77 The overall impact is that "[w]hile
most youths who engage in delinquency will desist by early adulthood
70. Id. at 253-54.
71. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 81, 139 (2000).
72. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 257.
73. McShane & Williams, supra note 67, at 266.
74. Id.
75. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 260.
76. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course Theory of Cumulative Disadvantage
and the Stability of Delinquency, in 7 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: DEVELOPMEN-
TAL THEORIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 133, 150 (Terence P. Thornberry ed., 1997).
77. Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences
of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 38 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAK-
ING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 162 (1993)).
[Vol. 56:927
BRIDGING THE GAP
as they move into jobs and marriages that give them a sense of place
and purpose, many of those who enter the criminal justice system will
carry the stigma of a criminal conviction," which will permanently cir-
cumscribe their opportunities.78
It has become clear that exposure to the adult criminal system is
toxic to juvenile development. In light of the enormous risks to the
individual child and the high costs to society, it is imperative that deci-
sionmakers exercise caution when dealing with adolescent offenders.
The consequences of an ill-advised waiver or application of blended
sentencing are so grave that the use of such sanctions must be
reexamined.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BRIDGING THE GAP"
Law, of course, seeks to punish harmful behavior. With adult of-
fenders, it is not unreasonable to say that retribution is the primary
motivation for arrest and prosecution. When the offender is a juve-
nile, however, other goals must be considered. Fostering the positive
social development of children and encouraging healthy personal, so-
cial, and moral maturation are somewhat broader goals than simply
punishing, controlling, or deterring antisocial behavior, but they are
no less compelling. The interdependence of positive development and
behavior control should not be ignored-we do so at the expense of
our youth.
Of course, youth must accept personal responsibility for their be-
havior. This corresponds to the developmental goal of encouraging
children to control their impulses, to consider the impact of their be-
havior on others, and to accept responsibility for their own actions.
We cannot and should not simply stand and wait for delinquents to
outgrow their delinquent tendencies. But the psychological effects of
retribution-motivated sanctions demand an alternative to the current
punitive approach. Indeed, every phase of the justice process-from
adjudication to disposition to correction-can be informed by the cur-
rent developmental research.
A. Adjudication
My first proposal is to extend juvenile court jurisdiction to age
twenty-five. Although policymakers frequently draw age boundaries
between childhood and adulthood, it is impossible to point to a partic-
ular age at which youths attain adult capabilities. The changes associ-
ated with the three spheres of development (psychosocial, intellectual,
78. Bishop & Frazier, Consequences, supra note 61, at 264.
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and neurological) do not occur simultaneously, and even within these
spheres, different capacities develop at different rates. Additionally,
there is a great deal of individual variability among youths at any
given age and in all spheres of development. Children cross the line
into adulthood at different ages for different purposes. Children of
elementary school age may be deemed adults for purposes of as-
signing criminal responsibility but are subject to municipal curfews.
Some seniors in high school cannot vote but can marry without either
parental or judicial approval. Childhood is a category with amor-
phous boundaries, so setting the "age of majority" at eighteen for pur-
poses of criminal responsibility is somewhat arbitrary. Because we
need not arrive at a single, definitive age of adulthood for all pur-
poses, setting a later age for criminal responsibility and adult sanctions
would reflect the developmental realities that make adult punishment
for juvenile criminal behavior inappropriate.
If the brain is not fully developed until the early twenties, then
there is every reason to lengthen juvenile court jurisdiction to include
older teens and young adults, and to target the time at which they are
likely to have outgrown antisocial tendencies. By expanding the juris-
diction of the juvenile court into the mid-twenties, we can continue to
offer guidance for as long as possible. At the very least, it would re-
duce the number of transfers to adult court simply because the offend-
ers were too close to their eighteenth birthdays for the court to bother
trying to rehabilitate them.
My second proposal is to set up a three-tier classification system
within the juvenile court. The categories are as follows:
" Persons in need of supervision (young children aged 5 to 10)
" Juveniles (middle children aged 11 to 14)
* Youthful offenders (older children aged 15 to 21)
One major conceptual problem with juvenile justice is the binary
nature of the system: you are either a child or an adult. But there are
enormous differences in emotional development between a twelve-
year-old and a nineteen-year-old. There are also vast differences
among children of the same age. It is difficult for society to accept
that older teens deserve the wrist-slapping treatment they get in the
juvenile courts when they appear so close to being adults. Under-
standing principles of child development can help guide the design
and implementation of more effective interventions. By further divid-
ing the classification of "children," we can help ensure that sanctions
are appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child. For
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example, the canons of the infancy defense, 79 which focus on the abil-
ity to formulate a criminal scienter, can be applied to persons in need
of supervision. For juveniles, we can focus on their competence to
stand trial and to assist in their own defense. 80 Studies have shown
that "competence-related abilities improve with age during adoles-
cence," and researchers have suggested "dual standards of com-
petenc[y]." 81 For youthful offenders, maturity of judgment and
potential for growth should be the focus of the juvenile justice system.
Treatment options for youthful offenders should assist in the transi-
tion to adulthood and job-readiness.
My third proposal is to eliminate waiver and blended sentencing.
Since juveniles differ from adults, they should not be subjected to a
criminal trial in adult criminal courts or adult sentencing. The re-
search in child development shows that children differ from adults in
ways that are important to criminal justice. If the portions of the
child's brain that are involved in morality, judgment, and the inhibi-
tion of impulses are simply not developed, it is difficult to attribute
moral fault in the same way that it is attributed to an adult. The retri-
bution behind some uses of adult punishment seems inappropriate
and unfair if a child is too young to be capable of the moral reasoning
and self-control expected of adults. The perception of gross unfair-
ness or indifference can further alienate children and cause them to
lose respect for the social system represented by the court. Any per-
ceived lack of fairness can lead to increased negative behavior, as the
"[f]ailure to set clear expectations for children's behavior, inconsistent
discipline, excessively severe or aggressive discipline, and poor moni-
toring and supervision of children [has been shown to] predict later
delinquency. '82
This potential harm is rarely part of a discussion on choosing be-
tween sanctioning alternatives, and it is especially problematic in the
context of child development. Failures during critical windows of a
child's development can have lifelong consequences because of the
profound impact that early experiences have on the child's world
view. A child who is subjected to a callous environment for a signifi-
cant duration of time is likely to make generalizations about the rest
79. For an excellent examination of the infancy defense, see Taylor-Thompson, supra note 45
and Bazelon, supra note 46.
80. For an excellent examination of the impact of developmental research and children's ca-
pacity to stand trial, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005).
81. Id. at 822, 832.
82. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 78 (Joan
McCord et al. eds., 2001).
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of the world-many of them negative. The principle of primun non
nocere is especially important when dealing with children.
"Adult time for adult crime" simply does not serve the child's best
interests. Society's desire for retribution and accountability by sub-
jecting youth to adult punishment comes at a high cost-the risk to
the child from negative influences while in prison and the risk to the
child's future opportunities as a result of the prison experience. If we
want to aid our children in developing their youthful mistakes, we
must eliminate both waiver to .adult. court and blended sentencing.
B. Disposition
We need to eliminate the incarceration of juveniles for anything
other than harm to persons. Normal child and adolescent develop-
ment requires a stable environment.8 3 Thus, it is unlikely that institu-
tional treatment, retraining, or punishment is effective in reducing
delinquency.8 4 It is even possible that the effects of incarceration-
alienation, stigmatization, and "contamination" by other offenders-
will do more to hinder positive development.
We will still need to incarcerate some juvenile offenders. It is be-
yond question that children are capable of performing acts that cause
society great harm. We can often prevent those harms only through
incarceration or some other form of strict supervision. We must rec-
ognize, however, that the juvenile who must be incarcerated should
also be allowed to proceed in his or her development to the point
where incapacitation is no longer required. While we may feel confi-
dent in concluding that a particular adult will always be a danger, that
83. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, AM. YOUTH POLICY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: RE-
DUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS-AND WHAT DOESN'T 17-20 (2000); Carol Sheldrick,
Treatment of Delinquents, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY: MODERN APPROACHES 968
(Michael Rutter et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What
Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash.,
D.C.), July 1998, at 1.
84. Little information exists evaluating the efficacy of detention:
No responsible business concern would operate with as little information regarding
its success , or failure as do nearly all of our delinquency-prevention and control pro-
grams. I t is almost impossible to count on one hand the number of true experiments in
which alternative techniques are compared; the number of systematic, though
nonexperimental, evaluations is not a great deal larger. We spend millions of dollars a
year in preventive and corrective efforts, with little other than guess work to tell us
whether we are getting the desired effects.
William E. Wright & Michael C. Dixon, Community Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile Delin-
quency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 14 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 35, 55 (1977) (quoting
Stanton Wheeler et al., Juvenile Delinquency--Its Prevention and Control, in DELINQUENCY AND
SOCIAL POLICY 428, 440"(Paul Lerman ed., 1970)).
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conclusion is far less reasonable when we are dealing with an adoles-
cent who is still in the process of judgmental and moral development.
The initial impact of incarceration will be profound, but the impact
of this sanction diminishes dramatically over time as children become
desensitized. Sooner or later, most children will give in to what others
expect of them. Children may begin to identify with some of their
more delinquent peers in detention. Thus, long periods of detention
are counterproductive and can have seriously undesirable side effects,
prompting a recurring complaint. from parents: "My child never even
thought of doing that until he was locked up with those other
children."
From a developmental perspective, prolonged detention is also
problematic because children are undergoing developmentally impor-
tant phases of life in institutional settings. Children are adapting to
incarceration and an institution, not to the community from which
they came and to which they must return. Thus, if we are to preserve
youth and opportunity while protecting society, we must be cautious
in our use of incarceration as a sanction. If we reserve incarceration
for only the most serious offenses, such as injury to persons, then we
can avoid the unnecessary negative effects of incarceration on those
youths who engage in the most common antisocial behaviors associ-
ated with the teen years: drug use, theft, and property destruction.
We must provide sentencing discounts or mitigation for those cir-
cumstances most likely encountered by juveniles-namely, peer influ-
ence (especially when dealing with gang-related offenses), bullying,
and other identity issues. Showing juveniles that the realities of their
life experiences are being taken into consideration by the people in a
position to affect their lives will improve their perception of the pro-
cess, as well as their chances of gaining the maturity and insight that
we hope to impart.
We must aim for dispositional alternatives to incarceration that will
encourage healthy moral development. For example, volunteer ser-
vice at a senior citizen center is better for a child than picking up litter
off the highway (unless, of course, the offense is littering). A youth
convicted of driving while intoxicated might be ordered to volunteer
in an emergency room. A constructive sanction for graffiti vandals is
ordering them to adopt a piece of property and holding them strictly
responsible for maintaining it and keeping it graffiti-free. This type of
individualized and nuanced sanction is developmentally constructive
because the offenders have a chance to experience the sensation of
maintaining their assigned property. They will learn what it feels like
to be at the mercy of vandals and experience the victimization of hav-
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ing his property vandalized. Moreover, they learn the inconvenience
and cost involved in cleaning up after someone else who has little re-
gard for the rights of others. We want to teach empathy, accountabil-
ity, and compassion, while allowing the impact of guilt and shame to
mold future behavior.
Wherever possible, these sanctions should be community-based
rather than institutional, and should build on the child's family and
community relationships. Both risk and need factors are to be taken
into account. For example, time with. antisocial peers should be mini-
mized, and the child should be exposed to positive peer environments
and other social elements. This will give children a genuine opportu-
nity to contribute to family, school, and community, while taking re-
sponsibility for the harm they have caused.
C. Corrections
Juveniles should never be housed with adults. If incarceration is
necessary, young people should be housed only with other young peo-
ple, segregated by age and severity of offense. There are many nega-
tive effects associated with incarcerating children with adults,
including an increased risk of criminal socialization. If we are inter-
ested in preserving and protecting youth and their future opportuni-
ties, we can never house children alongside adults.
We must also provide vocational training for youthful offenders
over sixteen. Vocational training provides the youth an opportunity
to enhance the development of personal competence and self-esteem.
In addition, we should strive for providing them with practical skills
that would enable them to support themselves after they are released.
Whatever the child may be suited for-even if it is vocational train-
ing-can be taught just as easily as social studies or science, and job-
readiness upon release from incarceration will go a long way in
preventing recidivism.
V. CONCLUSION
The view of delinquent youth that originally fueled the creation of a
separate system of justice for children in the early 1900s is still true
today. These offenders are children, and what they have done cannot
and should not change that essential fact. Punitive juvenile justice
policy, which treats adolescent offenders as adults, ignores this essen-
tial fact, and can harm a child's positive development. These sugges-
tions for sanctioning criminal behavior while promoting positive
development can be reduced to broader affirmative principles: focus
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on the offender and not the offense; fortify the child's strengths, com-
petence, and self-control; build on existing relationships; keep sanc-
tions realistic by setting clear expectations that are within the child's
reach; and provide latitude for mistakes.
The problem of juvenile crime does not lend itself to simple solu-
tions. We, as a society, have been struggling with the treatment of
youth crime for more than a hundred years. But courts have also ac-
knowledged that the state has a compelling interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of its youth.85 New models are needed not
only for the juvenile court, but for the departments of probation,
mental health, social service, and education. These departments need
to work together, and all participants must appreciate the value of
fostering positive child development along with controlling and deter-
ring antisocial behavior. Law and science came together a century
ago for the protection and preservation of youth. It is time to do so
again.
85. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir.
2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) (accepting the
state's interest in the health and well-being of children); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Web-
ster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a compelling state interest, but refusing to declare
unconstitutional statute limiting distribution of violent video games to minors).
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